[Will Hunt]

I can't offer an explanation for all the occasions where data suggests that storm overflows are operating in dry weather. I can only use what insight I have to suggest where the analysis might be limited and say that if there are any overflows that are spilling in dry weather then it must be fixed as soon as possible.

One potential source of error is the data used. The ultrasonic level monitors used for the EDM are not infallible and can fall victim at times to such things as condensation on the lens which can result in over reporting. Rain gauges are normally pretty reliable but, as explained above, even fairly small gaps in your network (I don't know how dense the Met Office's network is) can result in missing significant rainfall.

[webbo]

I can't offer an explanation for all the occasions where data suggests that storm overflows are operating in dry weather. I can only use what insight I have to suggest where the analysis might be limited and say that if there are any overflows that are spilling in dry weather then it must be fixed as soon as possible.

One potential source of error is the data used. The ultrasonic level monitors used for the EDM are not infallible and can fall victim at times to such things as condensation on the lens which can result in over reporting. Rain gauges are normally pretty reliable but, as explained above, even fairly small gaps in your network (I don't know how dense the Met Office's network is) can result in missing significant rainfall.

It was suggested on the Paul Whitehouse programme they were doing it because they could get away with it and there was very little likelihood of prosecution. They also had a Professor from Manchester university who was looking in to this and suddenly the water companies stopped sharing the data.
Call me an old cynic but this stuff doesn’t look good Will.

[Paul B]

Will - I haven't read the whole thread so sorry if this is a repeat, but just thinking about the combined sewers and storm surges/discharges. Is there any justification/explanation for sewage being dumped through these in low flow times? Or is it literally just a cost saving exercise to avoid having to treat it?

Perhaps I'm reading this wrong but CSOs are generally passive as Will described. I'm not sure if it's just your wording and what you mean is "having to avoid upgrading the network's capacity to prevent spills"?

As a general point, you might think that water companies fully understand their foul network. This isn't correct and a business was created by a Sheffield university graduate (who then cherry picked people from the hydraulics course) to build models and then verify them with measurements.

Exactly. 3500m3. The cost will be somewhere in the region of £7m.

This isn't a great picture but the only one I can find that shows how big these things can get. This is one of the storm tanks on the east coast when it was about a third dug (total depth about 30m)

This is what I was referring to in my initial reply to Dingdong. Adding extra capacity to store stormwater is a massive massive (and expensive) undertaking.

Will mentioned data dropouts and I suspect there will be some scepticism; in another application where there's a legal duty to measure something if someone important under a piece of legislation says so, you automatically become non-compliant due to such dropouts which means in my application there's still people going out and lifting chamber lids daily to record a level or flow. It is a real problem (as in the dropouts but also moving with the times and not requiring someone to be out in whatever weather sometimes in remote areas lifting heavy concrete lids).

Edit: typed in parallel to Webbo's post.

[Paul B]

It was suggested on the Paul Whitehouse programme they were doing it because they could get away with it and there was very little likelihood of prosecution.

I watched this. I can't quite remember what in particular made me think it but my memory is that it wasn't the best programme although it did make me raise my eyebrows a few times. I might try and watch it again. Dry weather spills were definitely an eyebrows up moment.

[Johnny Brown]

I suggest having a scroll through the twitter feeds of Feargal Starkey and Project Jamie Woodward. Dry weather discharges of sewage are not unusual and on some rivers routine. Not all rivers are affected, but some have declined markedly in recent years.

An additional problem (mainly in the south east) is borehole abstraction causing some rivers to dry up entirely at times, with catastrophic effects on the ecology, and exacerbating dry weather sewage discharge and agricultural pollution due to the reduced dilution.

[Tony S]

Bringing this topic back on course:

Avoid the slurry and help rebuild the bridge at Cress-brook Mill by donating to the PDNP Foundation's fundraiser for this at: https://shorturl.at/cesz8

You can also donate by:

Bank transfer to ‘Peak District National Park Foundation’, sort code 20-10-71, account 63364895, Barclays Bank, quoting Cress-brook Bridge
Cheque made payable to Peak District National Park  Foundation with your contact details and marked Cress-brook Bridge to Aldern House, Baslow Road, Bakewell, Derbyshire, DE45 1AE

However, if you want to add gift aid (giving them an additional 25%), you’ll need to email them for a gift aid form to complete if you use bank transfer or cheque.

Nice one to all those people who have already donated

[Paul B]

Found them both (although your post has a few typos). As I said, the dry weather spills did sound concerning. Likewise the reclassification of pollution incidents and failing works pausing output to game the testing (there was an employee stating this was happening).

In terms of BH abstraction, I've got no experience beyond some work to bring a few abandoned ones back into service during a period of dry weather which was obviously canned the second it rained. I assume that unlike a reservoir with a very easily monitored compensation abstraction is a lot trickier to regulate as it'll be based on taking an amount rather than ensuring an amount regardless?

Tony 

[teestub]

In terms of BH abstraction, I've got no experience beyond some work to bring a few abandoned ones back into service during a period of dry weather which was obviously canned the second it rained. I assume that unlike a reservoir with a very easily monitored compensation abstraction is a lot trickier to regulate as it'll be based on taking an amount rather than ensuring an amount regardless?

The water companies have limits on their abstraction licenses based on hydrogeology calcs to protect groundwater dependent terrestrial ecosystems etc. but often just ignore them because the regulation isn’t terrestrial. UU got what looked to be a decent fine last year but probably worked out quit cheap per litre! https://www.gov.uk/government/news/united-utilities-water-limited-fined-800000-for-taking-too-much-water-from-the-environment

This was a good news story about wetland protection https://amp.theguardian.com/environment/2022/sep/07/environment-agency-told-to-protect-wetlands-in-landmark-court-case

[stone]

For those who think shock at bridge costs is unique to cheapskate climbers: https://www.facebook.com/groups/derbyshireandpeakdistrictwalks/posts/1493212277910858/

[Johnny Brown]

Found them both (although your post has a few typos)

Apologies on behalf of autocorrect. Should have read Feargal *Sharkey* and *Prof.* not project. Assuming a few means more than two, what else did I/ Ai fuck up?

[Paul B]

No need to apologise, my attention to detail is hardly better currently. Links are probably easier for all:
https://twitter.com/Feargal_Sharkey
https://twitter.com/Jamie_Woodward_

Interesting (to me at least) to see the flowchart and the use of proportionality checks in Feargal's pinned tweet:
https://x.com/Feargal_Sharkey/status/1738154935248626051?s=20

[Tony S]

For those who think shock at bridge costs is unique to cheapskate climbers: https://www.facebook.com/groups/derbyshireandpeakdistrictwalks/posts/1493212277910858/

Strangely I had higher hopes for the UKB (cheapskate and otherwise) climbing community than the average Derbyshire cretin posting on FB.  However, at least they don’t seem to be whinging about charity platform fees…

[stone]

Strangely I had higher hopes for the UKB (cheapskate and otherwise) climbing community than the average Derbyshire cretin posting on FB.  However, at least they don’t seem to be whinging about charity platform fees…

Perhaps they hadn't donated and so were still blissfully unaware of those.

[Tony S]

Perhaps they hadn't donated and so were still blissfully unaware of those.

So you’re saying there’s still time for UKB to be better than the Derbyshire FB cretins?

Aim high!

[Paul B]

Tonight at 9pm on C4: Joe Lycett vs Sewage:
https://www.channel4.com/programmes/joe-lycett-vs-sewage

Obviously I haven't watched it yet but will make an effort to do so.

Tony, you can plug your bridge again now... 

[ali k]

Tonight at 9pm on C4: Joe Lycett vs Sewage:
https://www.channel4.com/programmes/joe-lycett-vs-sewage

Watched this last night. Thought it was a bit weak overall and his trademark stunt was a flop compared with others he’s done.
The most interesting part was how much of a revolving door it is between water companies and the regulators Ofwat and the Environment Agency with all the conflicts of interest that go along with it.

[teestub]

The most interesting part was how much of a revolving door it is between water companies and the regulators Ofwat and the Environment Agency with all the conflicts of interest that go along with it.

I’ve seen this flagged up as a criticism in new articles on this topic before, but without any evidence this is actually causing issues, did this doc flag any up? To me it seems like an in depth knowledge of the water industry would be a prerequisite for working in a regulatory position, and you’re only going to get that working for a water company. Maybe it’s just because in my field it’s very normal for people to move between consultancy and regulatory roles.

[stone]

I’ve seen this flagged up as a criticism in new articles on this topic before, but without any evidence this is actually causing issues, did this doc flag any up? To me it seems like an in depth knowledge of the water industry would be a prerequisite for working in a regulatory position, and you’re only going to get that working for a water company. Maybe it’s just because in my field it’s very normal for people to move between consultancy and regulatory roles.

I agree regarding the engineering side of things -but it would be good to say have a sprinkling of regulators from eg other countries to give an outside perspective.
My main beef with the water countries is the "financial engineering" side of things. They were founded debt free. They have a guaranteed revenue stream from customer payments. That money ought to be going to investment with a small % creamed off to pay owners. Instead the water companies have borrowed massively and paid out what they borrowed to owners and now say that the money customers pay is swallowed up by debt servicing costs. The regulator's job was to call bullshit on that scam. It is just a re-run of the classic scam that oligarchs pulled in the former Soviet countries. It was being called out by accounting experts etc but the lobbying effort prevailed. For privatisation to work, it would be necessary to also have such people as regulators. That is the root cause of all the rest of it.
https://dieterhelm.co.uk/regulation-utilities-infrastructure/time-to-pull-the-plug-on-the-water-privatisation-model/

[Paul B]

I’ve seen this flagged up as a criticism in new articles on this topic before, but without any evidence this is actually causing issues, did this doc flag any up?

No, it didn't, and yes, what you said; people with the expertise would've been working in that part of the water industry.

I agree it was very weak. It was very disappointing that the cost of improving network storage was simply put forward as a number without any context or discussion of the engineering (and sustainability) challenges.

The Whitehouse documentary for its flaws was better and raised more insidious issues IMO.

[ali k]

what you said; people with the expertise would've been working in that part of the water industry.

The problem with just saying “that’s what you’d expect and is what happens in other industries” IMO is that this is maybe ok if things are ticking along fine. If the water companies are doing what they’re supposed to be doing (i.e. treating waste water) and the regulators just have to occasionally intervene to keep them in check.

But the whole system is comprehensively borked if so many water companies are spilling untreated sewage on the scale they have been.

I can’t imagine if bridges or buildings were regularly failing on this scale that people would just accept a revolving door between engineering firms and their regulators as being ‘just what happens’.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but whoever regulates bridge construction must be doing an ok job given that we don’t have bridge collapses on this scale?!

[ali k]

I have no idea whether you work on bridges but insert whatever’s applicable.

[Paul B]

So, I'd love to go into this in more detail but my visa has just come through for Aus late Fri night and I'm expected to be on a flight on Fri AM with nothing booked, packed and currently having my parents' nightmare dogs until Sun evening, thus this will be brief.

There needs to be a distinction here in terms of 'failing'. In civils, there's two types of failure, SLS and ULS (quotes hastily grabbed from Google but they make the point):

"The Serviceability Limit State (SLS) is defined as the state of design beyond which a structural system loses operationally its serviceability for the actual service load that the structure is subjected to."

"What is the definition of the Ultimate Limit State (ULS) of a floor? Philipp Guirguis, area sales manager Dramix central Europe, UK and Nordics, describes it as the design state to cover the governing load case scenario, a design state prior to ultimate collapse, to assure structural stability"

When these systems are failing, it's SLS not ULS so in terms of a structure such as a building or bridge it's not equivalent to structural collapse which is what you're imagining.

It's also not a fair comparison. If we take a bridge (Tony's bridge we'll call it) that's a pedestrian footbridge it'll be designed for 5kPa to represent pedestrian loading and designed accordingly. This isn't increasing, it isn't going to be 6kPa in a few years as the population fattens, 5kPa is it. A combined sewage system is under increasing load from population growth (and is designed accordingly) and secondary to that, the stormwater component. As the climate changes and the nature of those storms changes (a 1:50yr event for instance happens more frequently) and the intensity of the rainfall increases, that pushes the limits of the system.

There may be a valid argument that companies aren't investing enough to tackle growth, but every wastewater job I've been involved in (I try and avoid it for obvious reasons) accounted for population growth and a changing climate with the design life of the system/structures. However, the point is, regardless of that being correct, at some point it will reach that design limit.

In terms of other structures failing in SLS I think you're just probably not aware of it. An example would be a retaining wall that's moved; Peewee will tell you, there are plenty of those all over the place.

[ali k]

Sorry for wasting your time in replying to what was probably a flawed comparison with bridges.

The point I’m trying to make is that surely it’s the job of the regulator in whatever industry to identify and investigate current failings, but also identify and flag up any potential future failings (e.g. due to lack of much-needed investment in critical infrastructure).

The water companies and regulators have known since long before privatisation that huge investment would be needed to keep up with changing circumstances. Indeed that was one of the arguments for privatisation in the first place. So the fact we’re still stuck with victorian infrastructure in 2024 and regularly dumping untreated sewage into rivers and the sea 35yrs post-privatisation shows that something’s gone catastrophically wrong and the regulators have failed. Why haven’t they been sounding the alarm for the last 35yrs that water companies weren’t investing enough to avoid this situation? Could one reason be that the people in charge of Ofwat are eyeing up a cushty job at one of the water companies to retire into so don’t want to jeapordise that? I have no idea, but it’s certainly an accusation they open themselves up to when they’ve failed so dismally in their primary function.

[remus]

I’ve seen this flagged up as a criticism in new articles on this topic before, but without any evidence this is actually causing issues, did this doc flag any up? To me it seems like an in depth knowledge of the water industry would be a prerequisite for working in a regulatory position, and you’re only going to get that working for a water company. Maybe it’s just because in my field it’s very normal for people to move between consultancy and regulatory roles.

The issue is surely more around people moving from the regulator to the water companies? There's is a clear conflict of interest there.

Say you're a big bod at ofwat/EA and you know there's a regular stream of people leaving the regulators for roles at water companies. Say you need to get down and dirty and start holding the water companies to account for some wrong doing, your judgement will be clouded by the fact you're not going to get a job at a water company after you slap a massive fine on them.

[Paul B]

The only person wasting my time is me being on a forum rather than sorting stuff out.

we’re still stuck with victorian infrastructure in 2024 and regularly dumping untreated sewage into rivers and the sea 35yrs post-privatisation shows that something’s gone catastrophically wrong and the regulators have failed. Why haven’t they been sounding the alarm for the last 35yrs that water companies weren’t investing enough to avoid this situation? Could one reason be that the people in charge of Ofwat are eyeing up a cushty job at one of the water companies to retire into so don’t want to jeapordise that? I have no idea, but it’s certainly an accusation they open themselves up to when they’ve failed so dismally in their primary function.

We're still 'stuck' with Victorian infrastructure in loads of places, the railways for instance have old tunnels, bridges and marginally stable retaining walls that have subsequently been developed around. People aren't understanding the scale of the challenge if you expect that entails replacing/upgrading all of the buried infrastructure from that era. Look at stuff like HARP (https://harpinformation.co.uk/) in the NW to see the massive challenge/cost associated with such things.

Hopefully Will might step in here to talk about how OFWAT and business planning works for the AMP period and the previous areas of focus (which followed some of the floods, sorry, I forget the year); the result was an awful lot of small, two-pump pumping stations.

The issue is surely more around people moving from the regulator to the water companies? There's is a clear conflict of interest there.

What's your solution there though; people only move in one direction e.g. from the regulated to the regulators? I don't think this is realistically achievable (people wouldn't risk the move without a SERIOUS financial incentive). I've worked for a consultant and then for a client who gave work to that consultant. This is unavoidable if people move freely within the industry.